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This paper problematises the question of how policy-relevant knowledge is 
produced, how it can include concerns of all stakeholders, and how it informs 
political processes, by focussing on a specific case. To do so, it surveys literature on 
impacts of resource expropriation and processes of exclusion on indigenes in 
central eastern India. It examines how a shift to local democracy in recent decades 
can potentially facilitate inclusion of concerns of indigenes and the environment in 
natural resource governance within this resource-rich but poverty-stricken conflict 
zone. It argues that, in order to enable democratic resource governance, evidence-
based knowledge must inform changes in institutional processes. It makes the case 
for a doctoral project being undertaken during 2012-15 that seeks to generate 
such knowledge. The project emphasizes the importance of understanding the 
relationship between decentralisation reforms and indigenous communities’ rights 
and participation in natural resource governance, in order to enable inclusive 
governance in a conflict zone of economic, political, ethnic and ecological interests. 
This paper justifies why this knowledge is required and describes the 
methodological approach adopted to generate it. It also preliminarily identifies 
gaps in the political process, explaining why it is challenging for such research to 
facilitate better implementation even if it does feed back into more evidence-based 
policy. 
 
Thus, this paper integrates key questions from the ‘evidence in decision-making’ 
stream into a specific case, highlighting the role of knowledge vis-à-vis power in 
enabling policy-relevant evidence to inform political processes. It aims to improve 
the manner of generation of such knowledge to include concerns of marginalised 
stakeholders, while acknowledging the challenge of creating an impact through 
such measures in a context where power rather than knowledge-based policy 
drives political processes. However, when applied, such knowledge contributes to 
sustainable development in globalised contexts wherein human dimensions of 
global environmental change find expression. 
 
Topics: Evidence in decision-making 
 
Keywords: inclusive governance, democracy-building, indigenous communities, decentralisation 
reforms, natural commons 
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The unwieldy but desirable union of form and content: 
Background 
 
How is policy-relevant evidence produced, does it include concerns of all stakeholders, and can it 
inform political processes? These are three important questions. In addressing them here, I first 
specify the ground as being concerned with natural resources governance in a recently-formed 
state of central eastern India, namely Jharkhand (‘state’ is often employed in this article, 
however, to refer to India and its government, i.e., the State). This immediately necessitates 
mention of certain preeminent aspects – the geographic focus is on a conflict zone of political, 
economic, ethnic and ecological interests. The region is endowed with vast natural resources, 
including forest and mineral reserves that attract attention from the state and mining companies. 
It is densely populated with poor indigenous communities who depend primarily on minor forest 
produce and subsistence agriculture for survival. It is also rife with conflict between the state and 
insurgents, although in practice anti-state actors as a category often includes anyone who 
questions or protests state activities (Prabhu 2004a). There is an obvious disjuncture between 
constitutionally-mandated policies and praxis, which tends to work against marginalised 
communities (Shah 2005). However, legal recourse is a rarely employed and largely ineffective 
strategy, due to tardy judicial processes and not least the everyday challenges of mere survival 
for most of those adversely affected, which very often negates long-drawn-out court battles as a 
viable option. 
 
This leads to the second point, namely that of the stakeholders concerned. There is much at stake 
in this democracy-building context; the very founding of Jharkhand as a state in 2000, carved out 
of the resource-rich southern part of India’s poorest state Bihar, was portrayed as a political 
solution to the loss of identity and political representation for diverse ethnic indigenous groups 
split up into minorities across various big states (in the tribal belt, which Jharkhand is a part of) 
at the time of Indian independence in 1947. However, a concern that has been flagged 
throughout is that the political will to push state creation gained traction not so much due to this 
purported purpose (which naturally had already had support from indigenous communities for 
decades), but rather as a consequence of commercial and political motives among the regional 
elite (Raichaudhuri 1992; Ahmad and Lahiri-Dutt 2006). Thus, in contrast to local community 
members, the mining lobbies (both private companies and state-owned ones with a  regional 
presence but often national and international reach), political parties and the government 
(particularly the forest department) at both the centre and state level are powerful stakeholders, 
as are Maoist groups, albeit with less legitimacy (Department of Rural Development 1990; 
Chandramohan 1998; Corbridge 1991). Moreover, given the ‘good governance’ agenda that has 
been pushed to the fore 1990s onwards, international agencies and donor organisations such as 
the World Bank are also interested parties with potentially significant impact (Grafton 2000; 
Lambin 2003; World Bank 2001). And naturally given the focus on knowledge here, the role of 
researchers and relevant scientific bodies is pertinent to consider (Agrawal 2001). 
 
Given this context and these stakeholders, the third point that naturally emerges is what makes 
this exercise significant, which is the fact that these are exceedingly common circumstances (Soja 
1989; Ostrom 2007). Indeed, across emerging economies, natural resource governance has been 
plagued with similar issues, and since the 1980s there have been widespread attempts to 
address them through decentralisation reforms (Agrawal et al 2008). A wide body of literature 
examines their significance based on empirical studies of these complex contexts which abound 
in today’s globalised and globalising economy (Forsyth 2003; Grajales 2011). Another significant 
set of strands takes up in abstraction the core questions of the nature of governance and the 
governance of nature, political and environmental subject-making, and state-society relations (Li 
2007; Goldman et al 2010). There also exists research that interweaves these discourses, reading 
empirical data through the lens of classical social theory and building more empirically-informed 
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contemporary social theory (Agrawal 2005, Lund 2011). What these strands have in common is 
their insistence at a ‘situated’ environmental science, that does not divorce environmental 
explanation and politics.  Yet any significant improvement to the status quo is perpetually 
blocked by a variety of hurdles – inertial dynamics strengthened by elite with vested interests, 
short-term profit-driven thinking – in short, the political economy of governance. In most such 
contexts, scope for external intervention is limited, fraught with political implications, 
complicated by lack of familiarity with regional nuances, and lacking both a platform and 
effective backing. What does make it essential, however, is the very real fact of ongoing 
deprivation, human suffering, environmental degradation and generally unsustainable outcomes 
of various undemocratic processes. 
 
Opinion is divided on what such external intervention should entail. It can take the form of 
advisory services to governments, who often lack technical expertise and accurate inputs 
regarding ground realities, and seldom sufficiently prioritise attention to the nitty-gritty of policy 
execution or the extent of resources required. It can also take the form of empowering local 
communities, who are usually the most adversely affected stakeholders but play the least 
determining role in decision-making processes. This includes channelling their local knowledge 
and proactively taking their views into consideration in planning, as well as integrating them into 
the technical language of the government, which has considerable implications for their 
awareness of and inclusion in the execution of activities (World Bank 2007). Notably, little of this 
leaves it up to local communities to actually determine the form of what occurs with regard to 
natural resource governance; rather, it tries to facilitate their having a say in the content to some 
extent. Which comes roundly back to the initial point of departure: how is policy-relevant 
evidence produced, does it include concerns of all stakeholders, and can it inform political 
processes? 
 
The argument put forward in this paper is based on the premise that, in order to be truly 
inclusive, both the content and the form of natural resource governance must be such that 
communities indigenous to the region are able to exercise their stake. One of the important 
consequences of such an approach is that it necessitates treating decentralisation as more than 
merely deconcentration of power. It ensures that, in practice as in definition, decentralisation 
connotes a devolution of power to the regional and local level, and that local governance 
institutions take their cue as much from existing community practices based in traditions and 
contexts best known to the local population as they do from standard models of institutional 
governance transferred top-down from the centre and state governments (Nathan et al 2007). 
This naturally requires context-specific understanding of indigenous communities’ manner of 
resource use, both in terms of their dependencies and resource management; but furthermore, to 
successfully wed the bottom-up with the top-down, this knowledge must have uptake within 
forms of local governance that maintain some degree of uniformity by way of institutional 
process (Davis 2005). 
 
Unfortunately, such a premise is closer to an ideal than to reality. It can, however, be justified by 
showing its irreplaceability for inclusion of all stakeholders’ concerns, as opposed to just those 
promoted by powerful lobbies such as private corporations or government departments. 
Therefore, this paper probes the Jharkhand context for examples of the failure of decentralisation 
reforms to take into consideration the existing patterns of resource use by indigenous 
communities and their underlying basis (Dreze and Sen 1996). It is implied that this is not 
specific to Jharkhand – while particulars obviously vary across contexts, there is broad congruity 
in the relevant literature on similar failures in comparable contexts. But to establish the 
occurrence of this failure and instantiate it is little more than stating the apparent to those 
familiar with critiques of decentralisation reforms. Here, this simply constitutes the background 
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for arguing that the relationship between decentralisation reforms and indigenous communities’ 
resource use bears detailed examination. Moreover, the knowledge thereby generated is of 
critical import for the production of policy-relevant evidence (Corbridge et al 2004). This is the 
schema based on which my doctoral project aims to examine precisely this relationship, and it is 
completed by considering the issue of how the knowledge thus generated can inform political 
processes (Rayner and Malone 1998). This will ultimately make decentralisation reforms more 
inclusive and effective. This last is no easy task, especially in a conflict zone where democratic 
processes have not so much broken down as continued their historical absence (Bates 1985). 
Moreover, as has been convincingly argued with respect to Indian states, and in particular 
recently-formed ones such as Jharkhand, the political processes of representative democracy are 
vastly removed from the process of policy-making, making the context a peculiar one where the 
successful application of democratic tools to bring in progressive policies often co-exists at a 
disjuncture with the complete lack of political agency on the part of the general populace in 
actually being able to bring those policies to bear on the contexts they rally hard to alter (Tillin 
2011). In other words, partial enfranchisement coexists with a lack of entitlement (Appadurai 
1984). 
 
Form and content – a troubled marriage: 
What decentralisation reforms lack in Jharkhand 
 
Local democracy has a chequered history in India. Community-based local institutions (for 
decision-making) existed for centuries prior to British rule, during which they were used to 
extract revenue from villages and underwent a series of complex alterations due to colonial 
influence (Sen 2008). Post-Independence, their existence, albeit weakened, continued but with 
non-justiciable status under the Indian Constitution, which came into effect in 1950. 
Subsequently, the landmark 73rd Constitutional Amendment of 1992 conferred constitutional 
status on rural local governments, marking an official end to the virtual control state 
governments exercised over local body elections during the interim four decades. Even so, given 
the federal structure of Indian polity, rural local self-governance bodies (panchayats) are allowed 
financial power largely at the discretion of their respective state legislature, within an intra-state 
three-tier governance structure where they comprise the bottom tier, i.e. the village level. 
 
The situation is even more complex when considering Jharkhand, carved out of the resource-rich 
part of India’s poorest state Bihar in 2000, and a classic case of a state requiring democracy-
building measures. In 2011, Panchayati Raj Institution (PRI) elections were held after a gap of 32 
years (instead of the maximum five specified in 1992!), under a progressive piece of legislation 
called the Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act 1996 (or PESA), which extends local 
self-governance to tribal districts. One such district, West Singhbhum, is the empirical focus of 
my doctoral project – a conflict zone of commercial mining interests, political instability, dense 
but rapidly decreasing forest cover, and displacement and dispossession of poor indigenes, who 
constitute the majority of the district’s population (Verardo 2003; Yorke 1976). Tribal policies 
have failed to address the economic and demographic transformation in post-Independence 
politics in the region (Corbridge 1988; Karlsson 2003; Li 2002). Despite India’s policy of 
affirmative action and self-determination for marginalised peoples (Constitution of India 1950), 
structural differences in income generation perpetuate their poverty (Kijima 2006). Ironically, 
while its exploitative history has birthed political opportunism such as insurgent activities by 
Maoist groups that cater to middle-class interests, a breakdown of law recently led the Indian 





It is in this charged context that India’s Joint Forest Management (JFM) programme, in 
accordance with the objective of increasing national forest cover from 11% to 33%, has since 
1990 functioned as state support to community initiatives in managing public forests, a key 
resource for the adivasis as well as the forest department (Ministry of Environment and Forests 
1988; Rangachari and Mukherji 2000). In Jharkhand, 10,903 Village Forest Management and 
Protection Committees (VFMPCs) have been constituted under JFM, covering 21,560 sq km of 
forest area (Government of Jharkhand 2010). These committees, in general known as Joint Forest 
Management Committees (JFMC’s) across states, have overlapping functions with PRI’s that are 
the subject of ongoing legal debate in recent years. The answer varies in practice, but the 
juxtaposition of traditional local self-governance bodies with those in charge of managing natural 
resources begs the question of who is in control and what is at stake (Hill 2006). Panchayats vary 
from being tools of good democratic practice to facilitators of institutional corruption and elite 
capture. JFMC’s, though partnered by the forest department, have a basis within local 
communities that varies from strong to virtually non-existent. They represent a technology of 
government that allows communities access to non-timber forest produce (NTFP) while securing 
protection to timber for the forest department to exercise its monopoly over commercial forest 
resources. There is a natural tension between these different interests and approaches, but the 
picture is far from rosy because there is a different ‘view from below’ with strong roots in recent 
history apparent in the literature, and forests are only part of the resource governance puzzle. 
 
In 1991, India’s liberalisation policy boosted the mining sector (Areeparampil 1996). 
Exploitation by coal, iron and related industries has adverse environmental impacts (Tiwary and 
Dhar 1994; Singh et al 2007). But the Indian state appropriates land for industry without 
contextualized negotiation, undermining adivasi cultures based in land-related livelihood 
patterns (Prakash 1999, 2007). Displacement of adivasis, often violent, accompanies this (Meher 
2003; Padel and Das 2010). Land encroachment has historically placed adivasis at a structural 
disadvantage, with their migration induced by loss of access to subsistence resources (Bates 
1985; Zurick 1999). Traditional commons, or shared natural systems like forests, are being 
converted to private property by invoking a nature versus culture relationship that restricts 
access and control, with local communities paying the price for private gain from such 
commodification (Caduff and Randeria 2010). This creates land alienation for adivasis, including 
loss of rural natural commons (Sharan 2005). Such loss causes breakdown of inclusionary 
structures for joint resource use, deepening poverty and forcing migration (Feeny et al 1990). 
Adivasis, including the particular tribe called the Ho my project considers, prefer to remain on 
their land, but the impact of changing access to commons has led to migration as ‘the last option’ 
in recent decades (Gupta 2009). 
 
Clearly, then, there is research that suggests with little doubt that decentralisation far from 
ensures equitable and inclusive resource governance in Jharkhand. Currently, governance frames 
political processes without achieving substantive citizenship for adivasis (Tillin 2011). Historical 
and postcolonial legislation results in ‘multiple orders of state law’ (Sundar 2005a), instead of 
recognising customary land tenure, arguably a prerequisite for direct democracy through tribal 
institutions (World Bank 2007). Unsurprisingly, then, adivasis stay away from the state, 
preferring an alternative sovereign structure, customary institutions, a sacral polity, and other 
forms of a local political economy that socially produces the state as a cultural imaginary (Shah 
2007, 2009; Rao 2005). But the state’s treatment of adivasis dooms such attempts to ‘produce 
locality’ (Appadurai 1996). Limiting such an alternative ‘capacity to aspire’ in subaltern 
populations can result in apathy or violence – here it aids Maoist propagation of anti-state 
violence (Appadurai 2004). A 2008-09 national report in India omitted a commissioned chapter 
on governance in tribal districts (Kirpal 2010). This chapter highlights progressive legislation 
that enables adivasis to self-govern in regions they inhabit, revealing “a damaging mix of 
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misgovernance, alienation and violent insurgency” by state authorities against them (Dandekar 
and Choudhury 2010). Proof of such anti-democratic censorship politicises the discourse, 




How decentralisation reforms can be made more inclusive 
 
Politics of poverty and exclusion require a relational approach that situates the “effect of social 
categorisation and identity” in the inequality of economic and political relations (Mosse 2010). 
The argument in favour of decentralisation is that devolving relevant powers to a representative, 
inclusive local body will lead to efficiency and equity gains in resource management (Smoke 
2003; Chambers 1994). This implies an empowered, accountable managerial entity. However, as 
instantiated in Jharkhand, this is a rarity in forest decentralisation reforms, which are often 
detrimental to the livelihoods of the poorest and do not go beyond de-concentration of power 
(Ribot et al 2010; Agrawal and Ostrom 2001). 
 
Figure 1: Representation of relationship between democratic decentralisation reforms and 
indigenous communities’ inclusion in resource governance of natural commons in a conflict zone 
 
The use and management of natural resources must be situated within broader historical power 
struggles (Jewitt 2008). To enable self-governance, basic structures affecting peoples’ access to 
land, forest, water and other rights must be transformed, and prior access restored (Sundar 
2005b, Saravanan 2009). Democratic practice can address the militarism rampant in Jharkhand 
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(Drèze 2000). At root, this requires facility, involvement, and equity (Drèze and Sen 2002). 
Constructive constitutionalism can empower adivasis to turn conflict arenas into opportunities 
to press claims for social change in their favour (Dasgupta 1997); e.g. the Forest Rights Act 2006 
(FRA) respects adivasi relationships with land, water and forests as the basis of their subsistence 
economy (Prabhu 2004b). Localizing and indigenizing democracy can enable community 
autonomy over resources through authoritative multi-level institutions (Drèze and Sen 1996; 
Chatterjee 1993; Dasgupta 1990). Through understanding the complex relationships and power 
dynamics at play, my project aims to identify how to enable democratic decentralisation in 
natural resource governance. Figure 1 illustrates the approach described. 
 
Matchmaking 101: 
Gathering and using evidence towards inclusive decision-making 
 
There is a great deal of ongoing research and political debate about recent legislature such as 
PESA and FRA and its implications for institutions such as JFMC’s and PRI’s and for the rights of 
tribal communities and individuals. But equally, there is evidence through journalism (e.g. 
Tehelka), popular Indian journals (e.g. Economic and Political Weekly) and fact-findings by civil 
society groups (e.g. Campaign for Survival and Dignity), that progressive policy-making in recent 
years has not translated into sufficient positive impact through actual implementation. For 
instance, the ongoing scandal over allocation of coal blocks that threatens to bring down the 
current Prime Minister has dominated press headlines in India – assigning of mining rights to 
private companies by the government is one of the prime factors that has led to dispossession of 
land for indigenes and remains a controversial topic in terms of legality and legitimacy. Different 
actors examining such effects are interested agents in their own right: state forest departments 
safeguard their interest in timber and other commercial forest produce over which they 
exercises a monopoly; the Ministry of Tribal Affairs, Ministry of Mines and Ministry of 
Environment and Forests are government bodies that are only critical of the role of the 
government in a strictly delimited sense and have their own targets; and civil society 
organisations often have agendas determined by factors such as their international donor base 
and the domains they prioritise work in. All these actors – interested agents in their own right – 
have some degree of influence in pushing their agendas through political processes, and serve as 
vehicles to promote evidence in line with their convictions. An important role assumed in part by 
researchers in such a setting becomes to bring the concerns of marginalised stakeholders into 
such political discourse through the directed generation of knowledge, or what has been called 
“politically-oriented social epistemology” (Fuller 2002). This is particularly important in conflict 
zones such as the study district, where inclusion is not guaranteed due to largely dysfunctional 
democratic processes. 
 
In gathering evidence for inclusive natural resource governance in Jharkhand, then, it appears 
important from the existing literature and institutional framework to consider the following 
questions in line with already existing policies: What is the influence of resource allocation on 
adivasis now, in terms of socioeconomic indicators and their own perception? How can the 
adivasis and village panchayats construct self-governed communities with easy access to land, 
forest and water, and an opportunity to maintain their own way of life, as mandated by Acts 
framed within the provisions of the Indian Constitution? Do adivasis advocate a feasible middle 
ground between conservation and exploitation of natural resources and the commons, and if so, 
what approach do they have in mind? And if not, why? How can institutional processes of 
resource governance prioritise fair allocation of and access to land, forests, water and mineral 
wealth to all citizens? Importantly, to identify feasible choices, these issues must be addressed in 
a language and manner familiar to the communities concerned (Blaikie 1999). The same logic 
applies, however, when communicating the outcomes of such an exercise to the institutions 
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responsible, including both government implementation agencies as well as policymakers in a 
position to tweak policies for better realisation of stated objectives and guiding principles 
despite the oft-observed disjuncture with implementation. 
 
In line with this argument, my project aims to achieve two things: to examine the relationship 
between decentralisation reforms and indigenous communities' rights and participation in 
natural resource governance; and to identify how to enable inclusive governance in a conflict 
zone of economic, political, ethnic and ecological interests. In Jharkhand as elsewhere, when dealt 
with appropriately, these factors contribute crucially to realising sustainable development in the 
globalised context within which the human dimensions of global environmental change find 
expression. Table 1 illustrates the methods that I intend to employ with the Ho tribe in West 
Singhbhum district. 
 




Data required Methods 












1a) How do Hos 
regard and interact 
with natural 
systems, which they 
have traditionally 
used as commons? 
Knowledge of historical 




Current Ho – resource 
interactions 
Min. 30 in-depth interviews, 
10 focus-group discussions 
with Hos 
Participant observation 
1b) What is the 
impact of 
decentralisation 











Views of Hos on how 
reforms impact their 
access to resources 
Min. 30 in-depth interviews 
and 10 focus-group 
discussions with Hos (as 
above); min. 10 in-depth 
interviews with Ho 
migrants; participant 
observation 
Coping strategies of 
Hos due to lack of 
access to natural 
resources 
2) Identify how 
to enable 
inclusive 
governance in a 
conflict zone 





how can they enable 
it? 




inclusion and exclusion 
Min. 20 key informant 
interviews at village, block 
and district levels 
Participant observation 
including village forest 
committee meetings; field 
data from Objective 1 
Means to address 
determinants of 
inclusive / exclusive 
governance 
Data analysis using 
triangulation approach and 
peer validation 
 
The crucial question remains as to how the evidence emerging from this can find its way into the 
decision-making process to actually create a positive impact. This paper has attempted to 
explicate the issues involved and convey an initial sense of the specific details; the research 
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